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The Origins of Nationalism: One problem, that of moral philosophy, is how to come to terms with the complexity of our existence, specifically, the ethical consequences of acknowledging both the individual qua individual as moral agent and the accepted obligations and preferences of the individual as a member of a nation.
A second problem is methodological, the principle of methodological individualism. The recognition of this problem is also not new. I remain convinced that the problem of understanding national culture is legitimate.
Thus, the works of Herder and Wilhelm von Humboldt ought not to be subjected to facile criticism, as is too often the fashion; rather, their works deserve not only, of course, a critical but also a generous engagement, as the objects of their concern are also our own. How to understand a national culture, given the principle of methodological individualism, is a problem that confronts every work on nationality.
A third problem has to do with temporal depth as a factor in the constitution of certain social relations.
The change of tradition in its reception — both its adaptation to, and contribution to the formation of, the present — has been observed often enough, both in the philosophy of history, for example, by Michael Oakeshott, and in works on tradition, for example, by T.
Eliot and Edward Shils. Nevertheless, however opportunistic and transformative the reception of tradition might be and often is, it presupposes already existing attachments and conceptions. The protean nature of nationality, recognized explicitly as such by Herder in his youthful Auch eine Philosophie der Geschichte zur Bildung der Menschheit, raises a predictable paradox for the historian.
The manifest weaknesses of the modernist theories of nationality have been observed often enough, for example, by John A. Armstrong, Anthony Smith, Aviel Roshwald, and others, so that their criticisms and those by Hirschi need not be repeated in any detail here.
Suffice it to say that the modernist theories suffer from a theoretically antiquated, unequivocal historical distinction between Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft, as Hirschi also rightly observes pp.
The nation can be understood as an abstract community formed by a multipolar and equal relationship to other communities of the same category i. In fact, Hirschi employs these categorial distinctions when he rightly and repeatedly observes throughout this engaging book that the imperialist political culture of the Holy Roman Empire co-existed with a fragmented territorial structure the same may be said, mutatis mutandis, of the Roman Catholic Church.
The existence of a distinct, defined territory implies a great deal, for example, established boundaries, the jurisdiction of a law code, and a relatively stable self-conception of the collectivity. The stability of that self-conception can only be relative, for the reasons mentioned above having to do with the reception of tradition.
And it is here where one finds Hirschi seemingly sidestepping an important complication in his otherwise rich and welcomed contribution by not considering explicitly this question: I have no doubt whatsoever that one finds significant adumbrations of German nationality during this period; and if any one does have a doubt, this book will or should convincingly dispel it.
There is much to commend in this analysis of the emergence of a multicentric discourse of nationality, not least of which is its drawing attention to factors long before what is too often and too simply viewed to be the decisive moment in the creation of nations, the Peace of Westphalia The relevance of the reference to ancient Israel here is because, as many have observed, the reception of its image, as a designation for both a particular people and its bounded land, from the Bible has been one factor in the early formation of European nations.
And Hirschi notes how the image of ancient Israel contributed to the self-understanding of, among others, the French, Czechs, and Swiss pp. In contrast, the tradition of Rome, analyzed well by Hirschi, can not avoid being burdened by three problems: No doubt, recognition of this burden accounts in large measure for the turn to the Old Testament as a way to legitimate, within monotheism, territorial fragmentation, including that of the Church that long predates the conciliarism of the Council of Constance.
However, deserving of attention are those numerous humanists — for example, Carlo Sigonio, Joseph Scaliger, Isaac Casaubon, Petrus Cunaeus, Johannes Althusius, of course Hugo Grotius and John Selden, and many more — who, in the investigation of the past, looked past Rome to ancient Israel.
Our problem is to ascertain the significance of why they did. When pursuing this problem we will not be content with an explanation that limits itself to the influence of the Reformation; for doing so begs the questions that are important in the investigation of Occidental nationality.
Hirschi is right to observe that this perception can not be taken for granted; it has its own historical development.
Take, for example, speaking a common language. Too many analysts begin their investigation with nationality at this point, often because of their misguided insistence that the decisive factor for the existence of the nation can only be state-directed policies.
Of course, the bearing of these policies or the work of intellectuals on the standardization of language is not to be denied; but, as Hirschi properly notes, there is a great deal of evidence from as early as the 11th century and increasingly thereafter for Germans being distinguished from others by the language they spoke pp.
Behind this distinction is the fact of needless to say an uneven linguistic differentiation from one area of land to another. However, for language to be a self-differentiating referent of a nation, crucial is the attribution of significance to that distinction; and Hirschi is, once again, correct to draw our attention to numerous intellectual and historical factors that contributed to that attribution.Social Knowledge Social Sciences is a major category of academic disciplines, concerned with society and the relationships among individuals within a society.
It in turn has many branches, each of which is considered a "social science". The main social sciences include economics, political science, human geography, demography, and sociology.
A nation is a stable community of people, formed on the basis of a common language, territory, economic life, ethnicity, or psychological make-up manifested in a common culture.A nation is distinct from a people, and is more abstract, and more overtly political, than an ethnic group.
It is a cultural-political community that has become conscious of its autonomy, unity, and particular interests.
The history of Finland begins around 9, BCE during the end of the last glacial period. Stone Age cultures were Kunda, Comb Ceramic, Corded Ware, Kiukainen, and Pöljä cultures. The Finnish Bronze Age started in approximately 1, BCE and the Iron Age started in BCE and lasted until 1, CE.
Finnish Iron Age cultures can be separated into Finnish proper, Tavastian, and Karelian cultures. Ethnic or racial unity- eg nazi Germany, cultural rather than biological basis normally, ethnic unity based on race but more often on shared beliefs and values, eg black nationalism based on shared history and culture, therefore share common history or traditions, recalling past glories, based more on future expectations than common past .
The Online Writing Lab (OWL) at Purdue University houses writing resources and instructional material, and we provide these as a free service of the Writing Lab at Purdue.
by Moya K. Mason.
This report was compiled in and was used only as a research tool for a series of academic papers. (Note: La Francophonie is used in place of Organisation internationale de la Francophonie in this report.).